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An Empirical Model of Wage
Indexation Provisions in Union Contracts
ABSTRACT
Cost of living escalators are an important feature of North American
labor contracts. This paper presents a measure of the response of index—
linked wage increases to concurrent price increases for a sample of Canadian
contracts, andthenanalyses this response in terms of a simple model of
indexation to the aggregate price level. The model highlights the impor-
tance of aggregate price movements in conveying information about industry—
specific prices. The empirical analysis confirms that industry—specific
correlations between input and output prices and the Consumer Price Index






(609)1452_140142An Emipirical Model of Wage Indexation Provisions in Union Contracts
A distinctive feature of North American labor contracts is their
provision for a link between contractual wage rates and the consumer
price index. At present, just under 60 percent of workers in large
union contracts in the U.S. are covered by some form of indexation
clause.!' Theresponse of indexed wage rates to concurrent price
increases is important not only for the structure of relative wages, but
also for macroeconomic wage and price dynamics.V In this paper,
measures of the sensitivity of contract wages to concurrent price
changes are tabulated for a sample of indexed Canadian contracts, and
then analysed in light of a simple model of indexation to aggregate
prices. The model explains an important property of the contract data,
namely, the dispersion in the response of contract wages to price
increases across different industries, by examining the relationship
between industry—specific prices and the aggregate price index.
The first section of the paper contains a brief description of
escalation provisions in North American labor contracts. It is argued
that diverse indexation formulas are usefully summarized by the marginal
response of contractual wage rates to the consumer price index. The
wide cross—sectional distribution of this response motivates the model
in the second section of the paper. The model shows that, if wages are
linked exclusively to aggregate prices, then the escalation formula
adjusts wages according to inferences of market—specific Input and out--
put prices, conditional on the observed level of aggregate prices. To
the extent that market—specific prices have different correlations with
the consumer price Index across different Industries then, the response—2—
of escalated wage increases to concurrent price increases varies across
industries.
In the third section of the paper, the model is tested as a
description of the intercontract distribution of the response of wages
to prices during escalation. Industry—specific estimates of the corre—
latlon between input and output prices and aggregate price shocks are
used to estimate the parameters of the model, including the relative
risk aversion coefficients of workers and firms. The data lend con-
siderable support to the notion that escalation provisions are tailored
by the bargaining parties to reflect their particular environment and
its relation to the aggregate price index.
I. Characteristics of Wagscalators in Major Union Contracts
Wage indexation provisions emerged in North American labor markets
over 100 years ago.'' The form of current indexed labor contracts,
however, was largely influenced by the historic 1948 agreement between
General Motors and the United Auto Workers.±" With few exceptions, pre-
sent day indexed contracts have adopted the pattern of the original
GM—UAW accord. In the first place, they combine both non—contingent and
contingent wage increases over the life of the contract. Secondly, they
link absolute wage increases to the absolute increase in the consumer
price index above some contractually specified base 1eve1.1 In many
contracts, including the 1948 CM—UAW agreement, the price level at the
signing date of the contract forms the basis for subsequent Index—linked
wageincreases..' In othercontracts, however, the base level is the—3—
price level at a date part way through the contract, or less frequently,
a percentage markup on the price level at the start of the contract.
Finally, most escalator clauses generate the same absolute wage
increases for all workers in the contract, regardless of the level of
their wages.
Formally, these features imply that w(t) ,thewage rate of a
particular group of workers in the contract at time period t, consists
of the non—contingent wage rate for that group at period t, w(t), and
a contingent component that is proportional to the difference between
the price level at t, p(t) ,andthe base price level pt
(1) w(t) =w'1(t)+ max [0, a(p(t) —pT)]
In this equation, c&represents the wage increase awarded by the esca-
lator per point increase in the consumer price index (CPI). A typical
indexed labor contract specifies a non—contingent wage schedule for each
group of workers in the contract, a base price level for the calculation
of contingent wage increases, and the index—linked wage increase per
point increase in theCPI.ZJ In addition, some contracts specify a
maximum absolute increase due to escalation.
On the basis of equation (1), there are several alternative charac-
terizations of contractual escalation formulas. For example, the margi-
nal elasticity of indexation in the tth period of the contract is just
ap(t)
w( t)
if the escalator is operative, and zero otherwise. Oneparticularly
useful way to summarize escalation formulas Is In terms of the marginal—4—




Incontracts with multiple wage rates that provide the same index—linked
wage increase for all workers, the marginal elasticity of indexation
must be defined with respect to a particular wage rate. Obviously, the
marginal elasticity of indexation is lower for more highly paid workers.
As a consequence, escalation provisions have typically contributed
toward the erosion of skill differentials during the life of the
contract
The marginal elasticity measure e provides an ex ante estimate of
the overall elasticity of wage Increases to price Increases during the
life of the contract, If the base price level T and the non--
contingent deferred wage increases in the contract are related in a
simple way. Observe that a linear escalation formula with no delay in
the start of indexation generates a wage—price relationship of the form
w(t) =w(O)÷a(p(t)—p(O))
where w(O) andp(O) are the wage rate and price level at the start
of the contract.2' On the assumption that price level growth during
the contract period is less than (say) 20 percent, this is approximately
equivalent to the constant elasticity wage formula
log w(t) =logw(O) + e(log p(t) —logp(O))—5—
where e =a Therefore, in contracts with no delay In the
start of wage escalation, e is an appropriate estimator of the elasti-
city of nominal contractual wages with respect to price increases over
the life of the contract. On the other hand, the same wage—price rela-
tionship emerges in the presence of delayed indexation provisions If the






According to this interpretation, the role of non—contingent deferred
Increases in the contract Is to compensate for price increases that
occur prior to the start of indexation. If the elasticity of non—
contingent deferred increases with respect to price increases prior to
indexation equals the marginal elasticity of contingent wage increases
with respect to price increases during indexation, then the total
elasticity of wage increases with respect to price increases over the
life of the contract Is approximately equal to the (observable) marginal
elasticity e
The choice between larger non—contingent increases, coupled with
longer delays in the start of indexation, and smaller non—contingent
Increases, coupled with shorter delays in the start of indexatlon, is
problematical.1 In any case, however, the degree of inflation pro-
tection provided by the combination of contingent and non—contingent
deferred increases Is approximately e ,assumingthat the non—
contingent wage increases in the contract are linked to the delay in—6—
indexation by equation (2). In the absence of any model of non—
contingent deferred increases In indexed contracts, therefore, I will
use the marginal elasticity e as an estimate of the ex ante desired
responsiveness of contractual wage rates to concurrent price increases,
for escalator clauses taking the form of equation (1). While this
measure abstracts from desired productivity—linked Increases in real
wage rates over the life of the contract, and also ignores cap provi-
sions that limit the size of escalated wage increases, at the very least
it summarizes one Important dimension of escalated contracts..1!
Figure 1 presents a frequency distribution of the marginal elasti—
city measure from a sample of 189 indexed labor contracts written in the
Canadian manufacturing sector between 1968 and 1975)±1 These elasti-
cities are defined for a weighted average of the highest and lowest wage
rates In each contract.!! Marginal elasticities for unskilled workers
are generally 7—12 percent higher than those in Figure 1, while marginal
elasticities for highly skilled workers are generally 10—15 percent
lower. The Figure illustrates two important facts: first, marginal
elasticities are generally between .75 and .95, although there are
contracts with marginal elasticities as low as .50, and a significant
number of contracts with marginal elasticities in excess of unity..!!'
Second, there is substantial dispersion in marginal elasticities. An
analysis of variance, however, reveals that a large fraction of this
dispersion is attributable to the industry of the contract. In fact,
three—digIt Industry fixed effects explain over 60 percent of the cross—
sectional variation In marginal escalation elasticities. On the other—7—
hand, the within—industry distribution of marginal escalation elastici-
ties is largely unsystematlc..Zi These observations suggest that a
model of indexation based on industry—specific determinants of the
responsiveness of contractual wage rates to aggregate price increases
can explain a significant share of the dispersion of marginal elastici-
ties illustrated in Figure 1. A simple version of such a model Is pre-
sented in the next section; and tested against the data in Section III
of this paper.
II. A Model of Wage Indexation
Assume that a union and a firm bargain over a contingent wage
schedule that links the wage rate in the contract to the aggregate price
level. Assume further that the firm sets employment in the contract
period, subject to the wage rate and the prices It faces for inputs and
outputs.!1 The basic idea of the model is this: if movements in the
aggregate price level convey information on contemporaneous shifts in
the demand and supply of labor to the contract, then the wage escalator
will vary the contractual real wage rate with the realization of aggre-
gate prices. In particular, if increases In aggregate prices signal an
outward shift in the demand curve for labor, or alternatively an
increase in the alternative opportunities for workers, then the real
wage rate will increase with the price level. On the other hand, if
aggregate price increases signal an inward shift In the demand curve for
labor, or alternatively a downward shift In the supply curve of labor to
the contract, then the real wage rate will decrease with increases In—8—
the price level.
The ability to infer the level of market—specific prices from the
observed aggregate price level implies that the desired elasticity of
nominal wage escalation with respect to the aggregate price level may
vary across industries, depending on the statistical relationship bet-
ween industry—specific prices and the aggregate price level.
Unfortunately, however, this model cannot answer a more fundamental
question: why not index—link wages directly to market—specific prices?
While there is some historical precedent for indexing wages to industry
selling prices, it remains an interesting puzzle as to the nearly uni-
versal practice of escalation to the consumer priceindex.121 The
approach taken here is to assume that wages are linked to the consumer
price index, and then to derive and test the implications of the model
for observed marginal elasticities of indexation in contracts where
wages are indexed to the CPI. The model cannot explain why wages are
linked exclusively to the CPI, only how they are linked to aggregate
prices in the presence of market specific prices.
For simplicity, assume that the contract lasts for one period and
takes effect immediately after the bargaining period. Let L represent
the level of employment during the contract period, let w represent the
contractual real wage, and let a represent the alternative real wage
available to employees during the contract period. Assume that the pre-
ferences of the union are represented by the expected value of the
function—9—
(3) U(w,L,a) =u(a)+—[u(w)-u(a).—()6J
whereu(x) =x1-has the interpretation a constant relative risk
aversion utility function and L has the interpretation of a reference
level of empioyment..a2! This function contains a number of well known
union preference functions as special cases. For example, if c =0,
then
U(w,L,a) =—u(w)+ (1 —-)u(a)
which gives the expected utility of employment when L0 represents
total union membership and workers are allocated randomly between
contractual and alternative employment. On the other hand, if
u(x) =x,thenequation (3) can be written as
L
U(w,L,a) =a+ (—)[wL—a5(-h-)dtj
and union preferences depend on the difference between the wage bill and
the opportunity cost of employment, assuming that the supply price of
Lc workers to the contract is a(—)
0
On the firm's side, assume that production is Cobb—Douglas with two
inputs: labor and non—labor inputs. It is convenient to parameterize
the production function in terms of the elasticities of labor demand
with respect to wages and non—labor input prices. Let —represent
the former, and let —rirepresent the latter.The assumption that
production is Cobb—Douglas implies > 1 and r > 0 .Assumingthat—10—
the firm sells its output competitively at the price 0 ,andpurchases
non—labor inputs at the price q ,itsprofits during the contract
period are proportional to
ir(0,w,q) .1.0n w1qfl
Finally, assume that the owners of the firmevaluatethe contract in
terms of the expectation of v(rr) ,wherev is a constant relative
risk aversion utility function with relative risk aversion parameter y
From the perspective of the bargaining period, an optimal wage
escalator is one that maximizes the expected utility of profits, subject
to a minimum expected utility requirement for workers. This is equiva-
lent to maximizing
E [v(ir) + X U(w,L,a)]
for a fixed positive number X ,whereexpectations are taken with
respect to aggregate prices, the alternativereal wage, and the prices of
output and non—labor inputs. Since
E[v(',T) + A U(cu,L,a)] =EE[v(T) + A U(w,L,a) p]
the choice of an optimal wage escalator function is equivalent to
maximizing
E[v(ir) + A U(w,L,a) I
ateach aggregate price level p with respect to the real wage rate at
p. Following this strategy, the first order condition for the real
contractual wage rate at the price level p is—1 1—
(4) E{vv(1r4!L. + (w,L,a) + (u,L,a) .!p] 0
where represents the derivative of the demand for labor with
respect to the wage rate w •Thisequation requires that the expected
marginal utilities of workers and owners are in constant proportion
across all realizations of the aggregate price level.Since employment
is set by the firm, the marginal utility of an increase in wages from
the point of view of the union consists of two components: a direct
positive effect, and an indirect negative effect via the employment
effect of the wage change.
Given a joint distribution for the prices in the model, the first
order condition (4) is readily evaluated. For simplicity, assume that
prices in the contract period have a joint lognormal distribution, with
E[log p] =log var[ log p] =
E[log0] =log var[ log e] =a21
E[log q] =log var[ log q] =a22
E[log a] =log var[ log a] =a2
and
correlation [log p,log o] =p1
correlation [log p,log q] =p2
correlation [log p,log a] =p3
Furthermore, assume that the conditional distributions of 0, q, and a
given aggregate prices, are independent..a!! Under these assumptions,—12—





exp{—nrlog (p/i) + o22(l—p22)}
where
=cov{log8,log p] I var{log p] =p1a/o
is the regression coefficient of unanticipated changes in the log of the
industry selling price on unanticipated changes in the log of the aggre-
gate price level, and
r2 =cov[logq,log p] / var [log P1 =p2o2/a
is the regression coefficient of innovations in the log of the industry
input price on innovations in the log of the aggregate price level.!/
By the same token, the conditional expectation of the utility of
employment at the alternative wage rate is:
E[u(a) Jp] =.jE[a- p]
jlt5exp{(l—cS)r3log(p/)+4(l_c5)2a23(l_p23)}
where
=cov[loga,log p] Ivar[logp] =p3a3/a
.—13—
is the regression coefficient of unanticipated changes In the log of the
alternative real wage on unanticipated changes in the log of the aggre-
gate price level. Substituting these expressions into equation (4)
yields the simplified first order condition recorded as equation (B.3)
in Appendix B.
Since the first order condition for the contractual wage rate
(p) holds across all realization of the aggregate price level, under
suitable conditions equation (4) can be differentiated with respect to
p to obtain the derivative of the wage escalator, w'(p) .Ifthe con-
ditional distribution of alternative wages and Input and output prices
is independent of p ,thenequation (4) is independent of the aggregate
price level, and '(p) =0,orequivalently, the elasticity of the
nominal contractual wage rate with respect to the aggregate price level
is unity. tre generally, however, movements in the aggregate price
level signal movements in alternative wages and/or firm—specific prices.
In response to changes In the conditional inferences of supply and
demand conditions for labor and the profitability of the firm, the
contractual wage rate adjusts with aggregate prices to restore the first
order condition. Some manipulation (see Appendix B) establishes that
the elasticity of the real contractual wage rate with respect to changes
In aggregate prices during the contract period is given by:
(5) -w'(p)=
&1(p)r1+ c2 p)r2 + a3(p)r3
where
- (l—S--)'1(p)+ 8(,+c)p)






!(p)= (=)E[(=) I a a
and
(p) E[(—) I1 exp{c(+)2a21(l—p21)+ c222(l—p22)}
The second order condition for w(p) requires that the function a3(p)
is positive.
According to equation (5),theelasticity of the escalated wage
rate is a weighted sumofthe three regression coefficients that
translate observations on the aggregate price level Into inferences of
the real prices of outputs and non—labor inputs, and the alternative
wage rate. The formofthe functions ' andc3 reflects two
distinct roles for the contractual wage. First, since employment is set
unilaterally by the firm,thewage acts as a proxy for the opportunity
cost of employment. The latter depends on inferences of the alternative
wage, and also on the level of demand for labor, to the extent that the
opportunity cost schedule is upward sloping (i.e., c > 0) .Secondly,
the wage represents a transfer payment between owners and workers. If
either party is risk averse, the wage performs an insurance function by
stabilizing the profits of ownersand/or theexpected utility of
workers.—15—
The general expression for the elasticity of indexation given by
equation (5) simplifies dramatically if both parties are risk neutral.
In that case, the role of the contract wage is simply to mimic the
marginal cost of employment, and insurance considerations are absent
from the wage function. Substituting 6 =y=0into equation (5),
23/ yields—
(6) aw'(p)=c(+n)r —crr+ r w l+ Il+c 2l+c 3
Given risk neutrality, the elasticity of indexation is constant for
all prices, and independent of either the expected relative wage gap
or the expected level of contractual employment p)
Furthermore, the elasticity of indexation varies with the industry—
specific covariances between input and output prices and the CPIif and
only if the supply schedule of workers to the firm is upward sloping
(e > 0) .Holdingconstant inferences of the alternative wage, if
increases in consumer prices signal an outward shift in the demand curve
for labor Cr1 > 0 or r2 < 0) ,thenthe contractual wage increases
with prices to compensate for the increasing marginal cost of employment
at the firm. On the other hand, if increases in prices signal an inward
shift in the demand curve for labor (r1 < 0 or r2 > 0) ,thenthe
contractual real wage rate decreases with the aggregate price level and
the inf erred marginal cost of contractual employment.
While equation (5) generally implies a different elasticity of
Indexation at each price level, if the variances of opportunity wages
and input and output prices are relatively small, and the supply of—16—
workers to the contract is fairly elastic (c is small), then the




where the constants c1 ,c2









andz =E(w)/ais a measure of the expected relative contractual wage
rate. These expressions follow directly from (5) with the substitutions
p) = andp) =
Thesigns of the coefficients c1 ,c2
,andc3 can be established
from the assumptions that c is small and that the expected relative
wage is close to unity. Under these conditions, c1 and c3 are
postive, while c2 is negative. Furthermore, it can be shown that
increases in the relative risk aversion of owners translate into
increases In the absolute values of c1 and c2 ,anddecreases in
.Ifowners are more risk averse, the stabilization of profits
receives greater emphasis in the determination of the optimal wage
escalator, and wages are more elastic with respect to inferences of
input and output prices, and less elastic with respect to inferences of—17—
the alternative real wage rate. Similar conclusions with respect to
changes in the relative risk aversion of workers cannot be established
unambiguously. However, for larger values of the relative, risk aver-
sion coefficient of workers (6 > 1.0) increases in the risk aversion of
workers are associated with reductions in the absolute values of c1
and c2 .Bythe same token, increases in the elasticity of the margi-
nal cost of contractual employment have an ambiguous effect on the
coefficients in equation (7). In the risk neutral case, increases in
c ,whichimply a more inelastic marginal cost schedule, increase the
absolute values of c1 and c2 and decrease the absolute value of the
coefficient c3 .Asthe supply schedule of additional workers becomes
more inelastic, the contract wage becomes more responsive to inferences
of shifts in the demand for labor schedule, and less responsive to
inferences of shifts in the supply schedule itself. These results con-
tinue to hold for lower values of the relative risk aversion parameter
of workers (6 < 1.0) .Theyare reversed, however, for higher values
of the relative risk aversion parameter of workers (6 > 1.0)
Finally, the elasticity of indexation is independent of the
expected relative wage gap between contractual and alternative
employment in the absence of risk aversion. If workers are risk
averse, however, increases in the expected relative wage tend to
decrease the absolute values of the coefficients c1 and c2 ,and
increase the absolute value of c3 .Incontracts with risk averse
workers and higher relative wages, greater emphasis is placed on stabi-
lizing the differential between the contract wage and the alternative—18—
wage, and less emphasis is placed on responding to inferences of labor
demand and the profitability of the firm.
III. Testing the Model of Wage Indexation
The model of the previous section gives a concise expression for
the elasticity of wage indexation in terms of the parameters of tech-
nology, preferences, and the contract environment. Any test of the
model against the intercontract distribution of escalation elastici-
ties, however, requires a description of how these parameters vary
across contracts. Since firm—specific information is largely una-
vailable, the testing strategy adopted here is to model escalation
elasticities at the three digit industry level. As it happens, the
individual contract data are not inconsistent with the hypothesis that
the within—industry distribution of marginal escalation elasticities is
uncorrelated with firm—specific factors4!' In view of this fact, a
comparison of the fit of the model to the fit of a simple industry
fixed effects scheme provides a useful measure of the success of the
model in describing the intercontract distribution of escalation
elasticities.
Industry level data is available that permits estimation
of several of the components of the escalation formula, including the
industry—specific elasticities of labor demand with respect to wages
and non—labor input prices (—and—nrespectively)and the regression
coefficients of output and input price shocks on aggregate price shocks
(r1 and r2 respectively). I also assume that the expected relative—19—
wage between contractual and alternative employment (z) is repre-
sented by the industry—specific union—non—union relative wage for
unskilled production workers. The remaining parameters of the model,
including the elasticities of relative risk aversion (andy), the
elasticity of the opportunity cost of employment schedule (c), and the
regression coefficient of innovations In alternative wages on aggregate
price shocks (r3), are treated as fixed and unknown constants across
all industries.
Let x1 be a vector consisting of estimates of the elasticities
of labor demand and the union relative wage for the 1th three digit
Industry (x1 =(j,ni,zi)),and let d represent the vector of
unknown taste parameters (d =(S,)',c)).Assuming that the marginal
elasticity measure e represents the desired elasticity of nominal
wages with respect to intracontract price increases, equation (7)
implies that the logarithm of the marginal elasticity in the contract
written by the th firm in the 1th industry in period t is
approximately equal to:
(8) log ejj =c1(x1,d)r11+ c2(x.,d)r2. + c3(x19d)r3 +
where r11 andr2i are Industry—specific estimates of r1 and r2,
c2 and c3 are the coefficients described in equation (7), and
has the interpretation of an error term. If contains
Industry fixed effects, then the parameters d and r3 are uniden-
tifiable, and equation (8) is simply a regression on industry dummy
variables. On the other hand, if =+
°Ijt
where Is—20—
homoskedastic and uncorrelated across industries or time periods, then
equation (8) implies a nonlinear regression with period fixed effects.
Estimates of equation (8) form the basis for the empirical analysis of
indexation provisions in this paper.
Prior to the estimation of equation (8), however, two issues must
be addressed. The first of these concerns the estimation of the
industry—specific variables on the right hand side of equation (8).
Under the maintained assumption of a Cobb—Douglas production function,
industry—specific elasticities of labor demand can be estimated directly
from data on the shares of labor and materials costs in the value of
Industry shipments..aW This procedure yields a contract—weighted
average estimate of the elasticity of labor demand of 1.67, and an
average estimate of the cross—price elasticity of labor demand with
respect to nonlabor input prices of Is
Industry—specific estimates of the union markup of unskilled wage
rates (z) can be obtained by comparing wage rates of unskilled
laborers in each industry with the average wage rate of nonunion
laborers.1 This methodgenerates an average estimate of the union
relative wage for unskilled nonproduction workers of 1.21, with larger
union differentials in the soft drink, brewery, tobacco, aircraft and
motor vehicle industries and smaller differentials in the textiles and
furniture industries. These estimated differentials must be interpreted
carefully, since they do not control for labor—force quality by
industry. Nonetheless, the general pattern of the differentials Is pre-
sumably correct.—21—
Finally, industry specific estimates of the coefficientsr1 and
can be obtained from the multivariate time series representation of
the consumer price indexPt ,theindustry selling price O ,andthe
industry input price .Ina one year contract, r1 is just the
regression coefficient of unanticipated changes in the annual industry
selling price on unanticipated changes in the annual consumer price
index. In principler1 takes on somewhat different values in the
later years of two and three year contracts. For simplicity, however,
differences in contract length are ignored, and all contracts are
treated as one year contracts..?2!
The following regression equations were fit by industry to annual
observations from 1961 to 1979 on the consumer price index, the three—
digit Industry selling price (deflated by the consumer price index) and
three digit intermediate input price (similarly deflated):
(9a) log Pt =a1log t—l + a2 log t—2 + ... +ak log nt—k +
(9b) log =
b11log 0_ + b12 log + b21 log
+ b22 log t—2 + vi
(9c) log =
c11log + c12 log + c21 log
+ c22 log t—2 + v2
Then, using the estimated residuals from these equations, the coef-
ficients r1 and r2 were estimated In the auxilliary regressions
(lOa) =r1 + lt
(lOb) =2Ot + 2t—22—
Very similar estimates of r1 and r2 were obtained from a two step
seemingly unrelated regression model fit to the CPIandthe industry—
specific prices.
The exclusion restrictions in equations (9) were adopted mainly
for parsimony. On one hand, selective testing revealed no evidence of
Granger causality of consumer prices by either industry input prices or
industry output prices. Accordingly, the log of the aggregate price
level was fit by a second order autoregression in first differences.
On the other hand, the lack of data prior to 1961 dictated a par-
simonious representation of the industry Input and output prices.
Lagged values of input prices were therefore excluded from the output
price equations, and vice versa. A two year lag specification in
equations (9b) and (9c) generally fit the industry price data well, and
more or less eliminated serial correlation In the forecasterrors.-91
The estimates of r1 average .27 across the 44 three digit
industries. Tobacco products, metal stamping, aircraft, truck
assembly, railroad equipment and communications equipment industries
yield large negative estimates of r1 (between —.90 and —.30), while
meat packing, bakery products, textile, woodworking, pulp and paper,
Iron and steel, and agricultural equipment industries yield large posi-
tive estimates of r1 (between .50 and 3.0). Across industries, the
pattern of r2 is similar to that of r1 .Infact, the contract—
weighted correlation of the estimates of r1 and r2 is .76. As
one might expect, Industries with positive correlations between output
selling prices and aggregate price shocks tend to be those with posi-
tive correlations between input prices and aggregate price shocks. A—23—
notable exception is the soft drink industry, in which selling
price shocks are negatively correlated with consumer prices while input
price shocks are positively correlated with the CPI.
The Industry—specific estimates of the elasticities of labor
demand, the union—non—union relative wage, and the regression coef-
ficientsr1 and r2 are all measured with error. It is well known
that measurement error In the exogenous variables of a regression
equation leads to inconsistent parameter estimates, and nullifies stan-
dard inference procedures. Given the shortcomings of the data used to
estimate the industry variables, therefore, the parameter estimates and
inferences obtained from the cross—sectional estimation of equation (8)
must be interpreted cautiously.
A second major issue In the estimation of equation (8) is selection
bias. A large fraction of union contracts contain no escalation
provisions.2.!! Oneinterpretationof such fixed wage contracts Is as
indexed contract in which the optimal elasticity of nominal wages with
respect to aggregate prices is approximately zero. According to this
interpretation, estimation of equation (8) on a sample of indexed
contracts leads to biased parameter estimates, since the regression
function and the error term in (8) are correlated, given that the
contract Is indexed (i.e., given that the optimal elasticity of nominal
wages Is greater than 0).If information on nonindexed contracts was
available, equation (8) could be corrected for selection bias in the
manner suggested by Heckman (1976). Since data on nonindexed contracts
are not readily available, however, such a correction is beyond the
scope of the present analysis.—24—
On the other hand, the decision to index is based on several fac-
tors beside the deviation of the optimal elasticity of indexation from
zero. Other things equal, indexation is more valuable, the greater the
variance in the aggregate price level, and the greater the precision of
the conditional inferences of market specific prices, given the aggre-
gate pricelevel.-' To the extent that the indexation decision Is
Influenced by factors other than the magnitude of the optimal elasti-
city of indexation, selection bias in the estimation of equation (8)
over the subset of indexed contracts is lessened.
Before turning to full—fledged estimates of equation (8), it is
useful to consider estimates of some simple linearized versions of the
model. If interindustry differences in the elasticities of labor
demand and the gap between contractual and alternative wages are
ignored, then equation (8) is just a linear regression on the parame-
ters r1 and r2 .Furthermore,the regression coefficients are
interpretable as estimates of the coefficients c1 and c2 in
equation (7), and the constant term in the regression Is interpretable
as an estimate of c3r3.Theresults of this regression are recorded
In column (1) of Table 1. The estimated coefficients are very preci-
sely determined, and remarkably consistent with the theoretical model.
In particular, the coefficient of r1 Is posItive, the coefficient of
r2 is negative,and their ratio (which Is an estimate of —(+ii)/n )
Isof the correct order of magnitude.- For the risk—neutral specifi-
cation of firms' and workers' preferences, these estimates imply an
estimate of the Inverse elasticity of labor supply Cc) of about .03
(setting demand elasticities at their industry average values).—25—
Assuming that the coefficient c3 is positive, these estimates also
imply that the correlation of aggregate price shocks and innovations in
alternative real wages Is negative.
The second column of Table 1 extends the list of regressors to
include the industry—specific elasticities of labor demand and the
industry—specific relative wage. While higher union—non—union relative
wages apparently reduce the elasticity of indexation, neither of the
demand elasticities adds significantly to the regression. On the other
hand, equation (8) is highly nonlinear in the elasticities of labor
demand, and their impact on the marginal elasticity of indexation may
not be adequately captured by a simple linear regression.
The third and fourth columns of Table 1 report the same
regressions as the first two columns, with fixed effects for the
signing dates of the contracts included as exogenous variables. While
the signing date effects improve the fit of the regressions, they have
only a minor impact on the estimated coefficients of the industry
variables. This reflects a more or less even Industry distribution of
contract signings across the sample period.
Table 2 presents nonlinear least squares estimates of equation
(8), utilizing the functional forms for c1 ,c2and c3 recorded In
equation (7). The first column of the Table contains estimates of
equation (8) under the assumption that the marginal cost of contractual
employment is constant at the alternative wage, I.e., that =0in
the union utility function (3). The parameter estimates imply that
workers are substantially more risk averse than owners, although the
assumption that owners are risk neutral is rejected by a conventional—26—
test.-' The estimated coefficient of relative risk aversion of
workers is 2.45 —veryclose to the estimate obtained by Farber (1978)
in modelling wage determination in the coal industry. The estimate of
the parameter r3 is —.40, which Implies that a one percent innovation
in the consumer price index is associated with a .4 percent reduction
in alternative real wages available to employees in union contracts.
In the aggregate Canadian labor market, the regression coefficient of
35/ real wage shocks on price level shocks is about —.65.— Thus the
fact that average elasticities of indexation are something less than
unity Is consistent with the short run fixity of nominal wages rates
elsewhere In the economy.
Rows 8. through 10. of Table 2 contain measures of the goodness
of fit of the various specifications of equation (8). The risk averse
version of the model in the first column of the Table explains about 15
percent of the intercontract dispersion in elasticities of indexation.
Relative to the benchmark of a regression on industry fixed effects,
however, it does somewhat
this general specification
significance level of one
of the model, this Is not
The second column of
specification of equation
ters are c ,theinverse
and the coefficient
neutral specification fits
the model. This should- not
better. In fact, the test statistic against
(In the tenth row of the Table) has a marginal
percent. In view of the parsimonious nature
an unreasonable standard of performance.
Table 2 presents estimates of a risk neutral
(8). In this formulation, the only parame—
elasticity of labor supply to the contract,
As the R2 statistics Indicate, the risk
less well than the risk averse version of
be surprising, however, given that the risk—27—
neutral specification excludes the relative wage variable z from the
elasticity formula, and the fact that in linear form, at least, higher
relative wages have a significantly negative impact on the elasticity
of indexation. The parameter estimates imply that the supply schedule
of workers to the contract is fairly elastic, but not flat.
Furthermore, the estimate of r3 is negative, although somewhat
smaller in absolute value than the estimate obtained under the assump-
tion of risk aversion.
Some further insight into the differences between model specifica-
tions is provided by the average values of the coefficientsc1 ,
andc3 ,recordedin lines 5. through 7. of the Table. The average
values of c1 and c2 are similar between specifications. However,
under risk neutrality, the average value of the coefficientc3 is
.95, while under risk aversion, the average value is .59. Since,
roughly speaking, the estimate of r3 is selected so that the average
value of c3r3 fits the mean of the dependent variable, the difference
in estimates of r3 between specifications is understandable.
The final column in Table 2 reports estimates of a combined model
that includes both the risk averse and risk neutral specifications of
the union utility function as special cases. The estimate of the risk
aversion parameter for workers is essentially the same as that in
column (1) of the Table. Allowing for increasing marginal costs of
employment, however, the estimate of owners' relative risk
aversion is larger than in the pure risk specification, and less pre-
cise. The estimate of the inverse elasticity of supply is .04,
although this estimate is not different from 0 at conventional signi——28--
ficance levels. Generally speaking, the combined model represents only
a minor improvement over the risk averse specification, and there is no
strong basis to choose between them.
These same conclusions emerge from estimates of equation (8) when
year—specific fixed effects are included in the regression equation.1-"
Results for this procedure are summarized in Table 3. The addition of
a set of fixed effects for the signing dates of the contracts has very
little impact on any of the estimated parameters. Furthermore, the
relative performance of the three alternative specifications of union
preferences is the same in the presence or absence of signing date
effects, and the test statistics comparing the explanatory power of the
model to a general industry fixed effects scheme are virtually iden-
tical in Tables 2 and 3.
Text statistics for the joint significance of the year effects are
presented in the eleventh row of Table 3. Across all three specifica-
tions of union preferences there is evidence of time—varying elastici-
ties of indexatlon. The estimated year effects indicate a trend toward
higher marginal elasticities over the 1968—1975 period, although the
37/ trend is irregular.—
Oneexplanationfor this trend is an increase in the variability
of the aggregate price level over the sample period. As the variance
of the consumer price index increases, holding constant the variances
of real price movements, the coefficients r1 ,r2and r3 tend
toward zero, and the elasticity of indexation given by equation (8)
tends toward unity. Since most marginal elasticities are less than
one, this translates into a trend toward higher marginal elasticities,—29—
over the sample period. Many observers, and simple time series models,
attribute a higher residual variance to the aggregate price level in
the mid—1970's relative to the previous decade.' If this increase in
variance was recognized by contract writers at the time, they may have
consciously adjusted their marginal elasticities during the sample
period. A careful investigation of this hypothesis, however, requires
time varying estimates of the covariances between industry and aggre-
gate prices, and is beyond the scope of this paper.
A comparison of the nonlinear regressions in Tables 2 and 3 with the
simple linear regressions in Table 1 reveals that the latter fit about as
well as the former, when the industry—specific demand elasticities and
relative wage variables are included in the linear regressions. On the
other hand, the results in Table 1 suggest that the industry—specific
labor demand elasticities are insignificant determinants of the margi-
nal elasticity of indexation. While this may reflect the inherent
nonlinearity of the true relationship between the escalation elastici-
ties and the demand elasticities, an alternative explanation is that
measurement error in the estimated elasticities of labor demand is
large relative to the cross—sectional variation in these two variables.
In the context of equation (8), a simple test of this hypothesis is
obtained by fixing the elasticities of labor demand across industries
and then re—estimating the equation, using only the interindustry
variation in the parameters r1 and r2 and the relative wage
to identify the parameters of the model. Results for this procedure,
when the demand elasticities are set equal to their average values
across all industries, are displayed In Table 4. For all three speci——30—
fications of union preferences, the parameter estimates and the fit of
the model are similar to the corresponding results in Table 2. Neglectv
any interindustry variation in the estimated elasticities of labor
demand has only a small impact on the fit of equation (8), and affects
none of the major conclusions from Tables 2 or 3. As it happens, the
estimates in Table 4 are highly robust to the values of the elastici-
ties of labor demand inserted in equation (8), and the fits of the
model are largely unaffected by alternative choices for these two
39/ parameters.—
Several conclusions emerge from the empirical analysis in Tables
1—4. In the first instance, the basic insight of the theoretical model
is confirmed. Marginal escalation elasticities are higher in industries
with higher correlations between output price shocks and aggregate price
shocks, and lower in industries with higher correlations betweeninput
price shocks and aggregate price shocks. Secondly, the fact that escala-
tion elasticities average something less than unity is attributed to the
behavior of wage rates outside the contracts. In this regard the evi-
dence from the indexed contract sample is consistent with the observed
relationship between aggregate real wages and consumer prices. Thirdly,
while according to the model firm—specific elasticities of labor demand
are important determinants of the elasticity of indexation, there is no
strong evidence for this hypothesis in the contract data. On the other
hand, the estimated elasticities of labor demand may simply contain too
much measurement error to provide a meaningful test. Fortunately, the
performance of the model and the parameter estimates are fairly robust to
alternative assumptions on the cross—sectional pattern of these elastici-
ties.—31—
The contract data do, however, provide evidence of a negative corre-
lation between relative contractual wage rates and the marginal elasti-
city of indexation. In the context of the theoretical model, this is
interpreted as evidence of risk aversion on the part of union members.
In the presence of risk aversion, the model suggests that the elasticity
of indexation is drawn closer to the elasticity of alternative wages with
respect to aggregate price shocks, the larger Is the gap between contrac-
tual and alternative wages. Since alternative wages respond negatively
to upward movements in aggregate prices, the implied correlation of
marginal escalation elasticities and relative wages is negative.2J
Finally, although the interindustry pattern of the coefficients that
link industry—specific prices to the CPIandthe union—non—union relative
wage explain only a moderate share of the dispersion in escalation
elasticities across contracts, the relationship between observed escala-
tion elasticities and the Industry variables is remarkably consistent
with the simple model of union preferences and firm behavior developed In
this paper. Overall, the data seem to favor a model of coinsurance bet-
ween workers and owners, in which workers receive some protection from
shocks to alternative wages at the same time as owners receive some pro-
tection from shocks to profits. The data also show a trend toward higher
marginal elasticities over the sample period. Whether or not this trend
is consistent with the model, however, remains unanswered.
Summary and Conclusions
This paper develops and tests a model of Indexation In long term
labor contracts. Starting from observed labor contracts, a measure of—32—
the elasticity of indexation is derived, and its pattern across a sample
of indexed contracts is presented. Of particular interest are two facts
about measured elasticities of indexation: their wide dispersion, and
their large industry—specific component of variance.
In the second section of the paper, a simple one period contract
model is developed under the assumption that the contractual wage rate is
linked to the aggregate price level. The implications of several alter-
native specifications of workers' preferences are derived for the elasti-
city of contractual wages with respect to consumer prices. The
elasticity of indexation is shown to depend on the parameters of the
firm's production function, the parameters of workers' and owners' uti-
lity functions, and the relationship between firm—specific prices and the
aggregate price index.
The model does not explain a number of interesting and important
aspects of cost of living allowance clauses in collective bargaining
agreements. First, no attempt is made to justify index—linking solely to
consumer prices. Second, the model gives no insights into the prepon-
derance of Indexation clauses that yield the same absolute wage increases
to all workers in a given contract. Finally, the model does not explain
the presence of both non—contingent deferred increases and index—linking
arrangements in escalated contracts.
In the third section of the paper, the model is tested as a
description of the distribution of escalation elasticities across
contracts. Estimates are provided for some of the variables in the
model, by three digit industry, and the remainder of the variables are
treated as constant across all industries. The estimation results—33.-
reveal a significant role for the industry variables in explaining the
intercontract distribution of escalation elasticities, although an
hypothesized relation between industry specific elasticities of labor
demand and the indexation formula is not confirmed. The parameter esti-
mates Imply that union preferences can be represented by a simple
expectedutility of employment function. They also imply that firms
display someaversion to the risks of profit variability. The estimated
relative risk aversion of workers is about 2.5, while the estimated rela-
tive risk aversion of the owners of firms is about .10.
In spite of Its simplicity, the model enjoys a reasonable degree of
success in describing the interindustry pattern of escalation elastici-
ties. The contract data provide strong support for the basic premise of
the model, that the response of index—linked wages to aggregate price
increases depends on the information that aggregate prices convey for the
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Least Square Regressions for the Logarithm of the
Marginal Elasticitya
(estimated standard errors in parantheses)
Signing Date Fixed Effects
Excluded Included
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimated Coefficient of:
1. Constant —.229 .186 —.190 —.036
(.013) (.220) (.048) (.229)
2. Regression coefficient of .103 .086 .086 .064
industry output price on (.021) (.024) (.019) (.022)
CPI Cr1)
3. Regression coefficient of —.079 —.063 —.077 —.060
industry input price on (.016) (.018) C.014) (.016)
CPI (r2)
4. Wage elasticity of —.042 —.024
labor demand () ( .057) C.052)
5. Input price elasticity .004 .003
of labor demand (ri) (.008) (.008)
6. Industry relative union— —.277 —.304
non—union wage (.149) (.136)
7. Standard Error .1745 .1721 .1547 .1542
8. R2 .13 .15 .32 .34
9. F—test for signing 6.08 6.03
date effectsb (mar— (.000) (.000)
ginal significance)
Notes:aThe mean of the dependent variable is —.224 with a sample
standard deviation of .188 •Thedata consists of marginal
elasticites from 189 contracts, drawn from 44 three—digit
industries in the Canadian manufacturing sector.
bF statistic for the null hypothesis of no signing date
effects.—36—
Table2
Nonlinear Least Squares Estimates of Equation (8)
(estimated standard errors in parantheses)
Dependent Variable: Logofthe
Marginal Elasticty of Indexationa
(1) (2) (3)
Parameter Estimates:
1. Relative Risk 2.45 0.00 2.35
Aversion of Workers () ( .70)
——— ( .70)
2.Relative Risk .148 0.00 .232
Aversion of Owners (i) C.042) ——— ( .101)
3. Elasticity of Opportunity 0.00 .029 .036
Cost of Employment (c) ——— C .002) (.040)
4. Regression Coefficient —.403 —.246 —.40
of Alternative Wage on CPI (.024) (.014) C.02)
(r3)
Average Value of:
5. c1 .092 .110 .085
6. c2 —.051 —.063 —.047
7.
c3 .585 .954 .600
8. Standard Error .1722 .1775 .1718
9. R .15 .10 .16
10. x2teststatisticb 64.9 70.7 64.5
(marginal significance) (.010) C.004) (.008)
Notes:aSee note to Table 1.
bDifference in the maximized log likelihood between the model
and a regression on Industry dummy variables. The test sta-
tistic has 44—k degrees of freedom, where k is the number of
parameters estimated in the model.—37—
Table 3
Nonlinear Least Squares Estimates of Equation (8)
Including Year Fixed Effects
(estimated standard errors in parantheses)
Dependent Variable: Log of the
Marginal Elasticty of Indexationa
(1) (2) (3)
Parameter Estimates:
1. Relative Risk 2.84 0.00 2.74
Aversion of Workers (ô) (.78)
——— ( .78)
2.Relative Risk .128 0.00 .234
Aversion of Owners (y) (.042) ——— ( .097)
3.Elasticity of Opportunity 0.00 .023 .053
Cost of Employment (s) ——— ( .007) (.044)
4.Regression Coefficient —.361 —.225 —.355
of Alternative Wage on CPI (.048) (.033) (.046)
Cr3)
Average Value of:
5. c .069 .087 .060
6. c2 —.039 —.051 —.032
7. c3 .579 .963 .593
8. Standard Error .1553 .1606 .1548
9. R2 .31 .26 .32
10. x2 test statistieb 63.7 69.9 63.0
(marginal significance) (.013) (.005) (.011)
11. x2 test for year effectsC 19.4 19.0 19.7
(marginal significance) C.013) (.015) (.011)
Notes: a,b5notes to Table 2. The regressions include fixed effects
for contracts signed in each year from 1967 to 1975.
CDifference in the maximized log likelihood, including and
excluding signing date fixed effects.—38—
Table 4
Nonlinear Least Squares Estimates of Equation (8):
Elasticities of Labor Demand Fixed
(estimated standard errors in parantheses)
Dependent Variable: Logofthe
Marginal Elasticty of Indexationa
(1) (2) (3)
Parameter Estimates:
1. Relative Risk 1.94 0.00 1.93
Aversion of Workers (6) (.67)
——— ( .68)
2.Relative Risk .110 0.00 .138
Aversion of Owners (y) C.038) ——-- ( .086)
3.Elasticity of Opportunity 0.00 .028 .008
Cost of Employment (c) ——— C .006) (.024)
4.Regression Coefficient —.387 —.246 —.388
of Alternative Wage on CPI (.029) (.014) (.030)
(r3)
Average Value of:
5. c1 .085 .106 .083
6. c2 —.049 —.061 —.048
7. c3 .614 .956 .618
8. Standard Error .1730 .1761 .1730
9. R2 .15 .11 .15
10. x2 test statisticb 65.8 69.1 65.8
(marginal significance) (.008) C.005) (.006)
a,b Notes: See notes to Table 2. The estimates in this Table were
obtained by setting the elasticities of labor demand in each
industry to their averge values across all Industries.—39—
FOOTNOTES
1. See Davis (1983). Unfortunately, no information Is available on the
coverage of Indexation clauses in smaller union contracts (less than
1,000 workers), or in the nonunion sector. It is generally
believed that escalation provisions are rare in the nonunion
sector——e.g., Douty (1975). On this basis, perhaps no more than
10 percent of all U.S. workers are covered by cost of living
provisions.
2.This latter aspect of escalation clauses Is emphasized by Gray
(1976) and Fisher (1977).
3. Indexed wage rates were instituted In the iron Industry around
Pittsburgh in the 1860's. Wages were linked to the price of pig
iron, with a one percent increase in iron prices leading to
approximately a .5 percent Increase in wages. SeeTaft(1945).
4.Carbarino (1962) describes the origins of the GM—UAW contract and
Its impact on subsequent collective bargaining arrangements.
5.Virtually all present day escalation clauses link wages to the con—
s.nner price index. n interesting variant occurs in the automobile
Industry, where wages are linked to a weighted average of the U.S.
(.90)and CanadIan (.10) indexes.Approximately 95 percent of
Indexed agreements in the U.S. and Canada link absolute (as opposed
to percentage) wage increases to absolute price changes. Douty—40—
(1975), p. 41, states that this percentage remained roughly
constant in the U.S. between 1963 and 1975. Formulas that link
percentage Increases in wages to percentage Increases in prices,
while rare in the manufacturing industries, are more widespread in
the government sector and the service Industries in Canada.
6.This is true of about 55 percent of the indexed contracts written
in the Canadian manufacturing sector between 1968 and 1975.
7.If wages are linked to price increases after a certain date r
then =p(T)is just the price level at that date (and is
uncertain at the signing of the contract.)
8.For example, an analysis of the wage rates of the highest and
lowest paid workers in 281 indexed contracts written between 1968
and 1975 in Canada reveals that indexation provisions reduced the
relative wages of the highest paid workers in the contracts by some
2.5 percent per year, on average. See Card (1983).
9.Non—contingent deferred increases are ignored. In contracts with
indexation clauses that take effect immediately after the start of
the contract, non-contingent deferred increases are typically
small: 2—3 percent per year In the case of many automobile
industry contracts, for example.
10. This wage—price formula is also equivalent to one that links wage
increases to the difference between the realized price level and
the expected price level, provided that the wage rate at the start
of the contract Is suitably chosen.—41—
11. Consider a delay in indexation until prices are pt ,coupledwith
a non—contingent wage increase that gives a wage rate w(t) at the
start of indexation. Once indexation is underway, the wage rate is




L w(0) (0) p(0)
12. In Canada during the early 1970's, for example, the United
Automobile Workers wrote many contracts with no delay in indexation
and relatively small non—contingent increases. The United
Steelworkers, on the other hand, wrote many contracts with long
delays in indexation and relatively large non—contingent deferred
increases. See Card (1983), Table 2.
13. The most widely used summary statistic for describing escalation
clauses is the ratio of contingent wage increases over the contract
period to the growth in the price level over the same period.
Obviously, however, this ratio understates the degree of inflation
protection intended by the contracting parties for contracts with
delayed escalation clauses.En such contracts, some fraction of
expected price level growth during the contract period is incor-
porated into the non—contingent deferred increases in the contract.
14. The data were drawn from individual contract extracts reported in
various issues of The Collective Bargaining Review, published by
Labour Canada. I am grateful to David Wilton for making available
the contract extracts. From October 1967 to October 1975 there—42—
were 1405 major contracts (with more than 500 employees) signed in
the Canadian private sector. Among these, 385 contained cost of
living allowance clauses. Excluding norunanufacturing contracts and
contracts with incomplete data, there is a usable sample of 189
contracts drawn from 44 3—digit manufacturing industries. Of
these, 108 contracts were written by firms with two or more
contracts in the sample.
15. The contract extracts report only the highest and lowest wage rates
in each contract. Furthermore, they give no information on the
skill—composition of the contractual labor force. Skill propor-
tions were inferred from three—digit industry data. The propor-
tion of workers earning the highest wage rate (usually a rate paid
to skilled tradesmen) was set equal to the industry—wide propor-
tion of craftsmen In the total employment of craftsmen, operatives,
and laborers.
16. 10 percent of the contracts had a marginal elasticity for the
average wage rate in excess of unity.
17. An F—test for the significance of firm fixed effects, controlling
for three—digit Industry effects, has a marginal significance level
of just over 5 percent. The within—industry distribution of esca-
lation elasticities is also uncorrelated with the length of the
contract, the identity of the union, whether or not the escalator
is a new provision in the collective agreement, or the unemployment
rate at the signing date of the contract.—43—
18. It is well known that unilateral employment determination by the
firm does not generate wage—employment pairs on the contract curve
between the union and the firm: see Leontlef (1946) for example.
An alternative framework is to assume that wages and employment are
jointly determined. For recent attempts to test between these com-
peting paradigms, see Ashenfelter and Brown (1983) and MaCurdy and
Pencavel (1983).
19. In one recent contract between 3M Corporation and the Oil Workers
union, wage increases are linked to average wage increases reported
in a survey of comparable workers.
20. AccordIng to (3), the marginal utility of contractual wages is
Lu'(w) ,whilethe marginal utility of contractual employment is
u(w) —u(a)(—)
.Thefunction (3) is quasi—concave for all
w, a, and L such that the marginal utility of contractual
employment is positive.
21. This simplifying assumption implies that the covariance of log 0
and log q arises solely from their joint covariance with log p.
Formally, it requires cov[log 0,log q] =cov[log0,log p] cov[iog
q,log p] /var[log P1.
22. These formulas follow from the formula in Appendix A.
23. Equation (6) represents a generalization of the indexation formula
analyzed by Blanchard (1978).
24. Note that (7) implies (6) if I == 0,asrequired by the risk
neutrality hypothesis.—44—
25. See Footnote 17.
26. The share of labor costs in the value of shipments is (—l)(+n),
while the share of materials costs in the value of shipments is
n/(+n). The value—added data pertain to 1971: data sources are
listed in Appendix C.
27. These elasticities are necessarily larger in absolute value than
the constant output elasticities typically estimated In the
literature. The Cobb—Douglas functional form implies that the
output—constant elasticity of demand for labor with respect to
wages is —l ,whilethe output—constant elasticity of demand for
labor with respect to materials prices is 0. Most aggregate stu-
dies show that the output—constant elasticity of demand for labor
with respect to wages is less than 1 in absolute value: See
Hamermesh (1976).
28. Micro—data estimates of the union relative wage gap by industry are
unavailable for Canada. As an alternative, I used the following
method to obtain crude estimates of the union markup by industry,
based on 1971 industry wage data. Assume that the logarithm of the
average wage rate of unskilled workers in an industry at a par-
ticular location (Toronto, Montreal or Vancouver, depending on the
industry) is a weighted average of the nonunion and union wage
rates, where the weight on the union wage is the fraction of
unionized workers In the industry. Suppose further that nonunion
wage rates for unskilled workers are identical across industries—45—
(ata particular location) and equal to 90 percent of the average
wage rate across all industries. Then the industry—specific union
wage markup is the difference between the log of the average
industry wage, and the log of the average nonunion wage, divided by
the percent of unionized workers in the industry. The data source
for the industry wage rates is listed in Appendix C.
29. The individual contract data do not reject this simplifying assump-
tion. Holding constant industry fixed effects, contract length
dummyvariablesare insignificant in a regression equation for
the marginal elasticity of indexation.
30. Unfortunately, the sample period includes the 1973—4 episode of
dramatic increases in raw materials prices. To the extent that
the pattern of these increases was extraordinary, data from 1973—4
represent outliers which should be discounted in estimation. Some
experimentation revealed that the estimates of r1 and r2 were
fairly sensitive to inclusion or exclusion of the 1973—4 data.
31. In 1982 for instance, only 22 percent of the major agreements
signed in Canada included indexation clauses. In the same year,
57 percent of workers covered by major contracts in the U.S. had
index—linked wages.
32. The relationship between the variance of the aggregate price level
and the indexation decision is described by Ehrenberg, Danziger and
San (1983). As an empirical matter, most of the changes over time
in the proportion of indexed contracts seems to be correlated with—46—
aggregate price level uncertainty. For example, in 1958 the pro-
portion of workers in major union contracts in the U.S. covered by
indexation provisions stood at 50 percent. This fraction fell
steadily through the early 1960's, reaching 20 percent in 1966.
Then, in the late 1960's and early 1970's, there was a sharp
resurgence in indexed contracts. See Douty (1975) Table 1, page
12. Coverage by escalation provisions reached 60 percent in 1978,
and has fallen only slightly since then. See Davis (1983).
33. The contract—weighted average value of .—is.53. Using the
estimates in column (1) of Table 1, the restriction that the
regression coefficient of r2 is —.53 times the regression
coefficient of r1 yields a t—ratio of 2.46.
34. In the presence of measurement error in the industry variables
however, conventional significance levels may be inappropriate.
35. This estimate is obtained from the correlation of the residuals
from a second order vector autoregressive representation of the
logarithms of annual real average hourly earnings in manufacturing
and the consumer price index.
36. Since equation (8) does not include an unrestricted intercept, the
parameter estimates are not invariant to the choice of a basis year
from which to measure the year effects. Arbitrarily, 1971 was
selected as a basis year. The mean elasticity among contracts
signed in 1971 is very close to the mean elasticity over all years.
Alternative choices for the basis year mainly effect the estimate
of r3—47—
37. The mean elasticities of indexation by signing date of the contract
are:
1967—.65(3contracts)







38. Riddell and Smith (1982) fit a time—varying autoregressive moving
average model to the Canadian CPI and find increasing residual
variances in the 1970's.
39. For example, setting the wage elasticity of labor demand at —.70
and the input price elasticity of labor demand at —.60, the para-
meter estimates and their estimated standard errors are as follows:
for the pure risk specification (column 1 in Tables 2—4) 5 =
2.49(.63),y =.200(.06l),r3 =.745(.063),standard error ofthe
regression =.1746;for the risk neutral specification (column 2 in
Tables 2—4) c =.0741(.018),r3 =—.249(.015),standarderror of
the regression =.1786;for the combined specification (column 3 in
Tables 2—4) =2.47(.66),y =.608(.223), =.566(.33l),
r3
=—.677(.088),standarderror of the regression =.1733.
40. An alternative explanation for the negative correlation between
industry relative wages and industry escalation elasticities is
that contract negotiators tend to mimic indexatlon provisions in
other recent contracts. If low wage industries adopt the same—48--
indexed wage increase per point increase in the CPI as other
Industries, they induce a negative correlation between industry
wage rates and marginal escalation elasticities.—49-.
Appendix A
This appendix presents an expression for E[Xa I y] ,whenx and
y have a joint lognormal distribution.
Suppose log x and log y are jointly normally distributed with means
log and log yrespectively, variances and ,respectively,
and covariance pa •Giveny ,logx is normally distributed with
mean log+ p— (log y —log),andthe variance r2(1—p2), or
equivalently, (x/x) is lognorinally distributed, with the mean of
log (x/) equal to p log (y/) and variance of log (x/) equal to
(1—p)
Since
E[Xa I I1 .a E[()]
it is sufficient to find E[za] for z lognormally distributed with
mean log z =p ,andvariance log z =






performing the change of variables w =logz •Thelatter expression is—50—
just the expression for the moment generating function of a normally
distributed variable. Therefore
E[Za] =exp[ai + a2 2]
and substituting z =x/, =plog (y/) ,anda2 =a2(1—p2),
E[Xa I= aexp[a2Elog(y/) + 4a2a(1—p2)]—51—
AppendixB
This appendix presents a derivation of equation (5) in the text.
The first step is to evaluate the first—order condition (4). From (3),









LC =L{u'(w) -!{u(w)- u(a)(-r-) ]}
l—c5—) +fl -ó flq
+ (-i-)(l+c) —l—(l+e) —(l+c) 1—cS — 0 w q a
+ri — —n 1 1—cS using L =0 wq ,andu(w) = w •Fromthe envelope
aTr
property of the profit function, — =—L,andtherefore
——i(l—) 0(-I-n)(l—i) qfl(lY) '2 v'(ir)—=— w
The first order condition is
E[p2 + Xp1p] =0—52—
which implies
(B.1) l—Ô— -+T1qn E[(——J (4_)flJp] 1— 0 q




where K is a constant.
The expectations can be evaluated using the formula in Appendix A,











Then (B.1) can be written as:
(B.2) exp [t1 log (p/i) + Si]
+W'L0 0(+n)c 11Cexp[((l+c)t1 + t2) log (p/i) + (l+e)2 s1 +
=i(1) exp[(1—y)t1 log (p/i) ÷(i_y)2s]
.—53—
Dividing (B.2) by its right hand side yields:
(B.3) ...cS+y(l..) +r)y exp [it1 log (p/a) + (2-y—y2)s1]
+—l—+y(l—)L0C o()+1)qn(C+1)
exp[((+i)t1+t2) log (p/i) + (2(c+y) + —
12)si+ s2] =K
















e1 =exp[1t11og(p/) + (2i—i2)s1]
e2 =exp[((+'r)t1+ t2) log (p/i) + (2(e+y) + —y2)s+—54—
Note that D <0is required by the second order condition for w
Simplifying (B.4) yields:
(B.5)
l—-8 uytea1(W+ J((+y)t + l—5 11 l—5 L0
w dpl—— 1—5 ___________ l-ôW(5+y(—l))e1(°)(i($-1)+l)e2
Finally, using
e2 =e1exp [t2 log (p/) + s2] exp[Et1 log(p/i) + €251] exp[2c s1]
nc —IpI=( E [() W'q
)exp [ct1 log (p/v) + c2si]
E [a1- I p] = exp[t2 log(pf) + s2]
and defining
ü) (p)=(--) E [(-a--) Ip] a a
Le p) =E[(t—J
Ip]exp [2 c s]








Equation (5) in the text follows Immediately—55—
Appendix C —DataSources
1. Industry—specific shares of labor and raw materials in industry
value—added pertain to 1971 and are taken from "Manufacturing
Industries In Canada: Type of Organization and Size of
Establishment". Statistics Canada, Primary Industries Division,
Ottawa, 1973.
2. Industry—specific selling prices are taken from "Industry Price
Indexes". Statistics Canada, Prices Division, Ottawa, August 1980.
3. Industry—specific input prices are taken from "Gross Domestic
Product By Industry." Statistics Canada, Industry Product Division,
Ottawa, March 1982.
4. Industry—specific union—non—union relative wage rates are based on
industry—specific wage rates in 1971 in selected urban areas,
reported in "Wage Rates, Salaries, and Hours of Labour". Labor
Canada, Ottawa, 1971.—56—
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